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Focus: On the new theory of photography
Catharine Abell, Paloma Atencia-Linares, Dominic McIver, Lopes 
Diarmuid Costello, The New Theory of Photography: Critical 
Examination and Responses
Abstract. Dominic McIver Lopes’ Four Arts of Photography and Diarmuid Costello’s 
On Photography: A Philosophical Inquiry examine the state of the art in analytic phi-
losophy of photography and present a new approach to the study of the medium. As 
opposed to the orthodox and prevalent view, which emphasizes its epistemic capacities, 
the new theory reconsiders the nature of photography, and redirects focus towards the 
aesthetic potential of the medium. This symposium comprises two papers that criti-
cally examine central questions addressed in the two books, with responses by the two 
authors in defence of their respective positions.
Keywords. Photography, New Theory, Lopes, Costello.
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OUT WITH THE OLD? THE NEW THEORY OF 
PHOTOGRAPHY
Catharine Abell
(University of Manchester)
catharine.abell@manchester.ac.uk
Abstract. Orthodox theories construe belief-independent fea-
ture tracking as essential to photography. This captures its 
epistemic import, but casts doubt on its aesthetic import by 
restricting photographers’ role in shaping the photographic 
process. By contrast, new theories of photography construe the 
photographic process as distinctive only in using information 
recorded from a photographic event to produce a visual image. 
This allows significant latitude in how that information is used 
to produce a visual image, thus allowing photographers much 
greater influence in shaping that process. New theories therefore 
apparently better accommodate the aesthetic import of photog-
raphy than their orthodox rivals. However, I argue that, if new 
theories are to capture what’s distinctive about photography 
and to explain its epistemic import, they need to impose some 
restrictions on the ways in which information recorded from a 
photographic event is used to produce a visual image. I consider 
the form these restrictions should take, and their implications 
for explaining the epistemic import of photography.
Keywords. Photography, Information, Art, Knowledge.
Two books have recently been published 
which, together, suggest something of a sea change 
in philosophical conceptions of photography. 
These are Dominic Lopes’s Four Arts of Photog-
raphy (2016) and Diarmuid Costello’s On Photog-
raphy (2018). Although each differs in its specific 
foci and in the precise scope of its explanatory 
ambitions, both share the aim of reconciling an 
apparent conflict between the aesthetic and the 
epistemic roles commonly ascribed to photogra-
phy and on doing so in such a way as to inform 
our understanding of the nature of photography. 
Moreover, both ultimately endorse similar concep-
tions of photography as the appropriate means of 
reconciling this conflict. This conception differs 
significantly from what has until now been the 
dominant philosophical conception.
As Lopes and Costello note, there is a problem 
implicit in contemporary thought about photogra-
phy. On the one hand, we consider photography an 
art form. Implicit in this view is the conviction that 
photographs can manifest photographers’ individu-
al intentions and other mental states. On the other 
hand, however, we assign photography an impor-
tant epistemic role, privileging photographs over 
drawings and other representations in a wide vari-
ety of contexts precisely because they seem immune 
to the influence of photographers’ mental states. 
Both Lopes and Costello argue that what Costello 
terms the «orthodox» philosophical construal of 
photography lacks the resources to accommodate 
its status as an art and advocate an alternative to 
this orthodoxy which they take to be superior in 
its ability to do justice to photography as an art 
form. In what follows, I describe the current ortho-
doxy, explain how it engenders scepticism about 
the claim that photography is an art, outline both 
how Costello and Lopes respond to this scepticism 
and describe the philosophical theory they endorse 
as better capturing the nature of photography and 
its artistic import. Having done this, I assess the 
respective merits and demerits of their «new theo-
ry» of photography and its orthodox rival. I argue 
that, while in some respect the new theory is to be 
preferred, its current incarnations do not fulfil its 
advocates’ explanatory ambitions.
1. The philosophical orthodoxy 
The orthodox view foregrounds the explana-
tion of the epistemic role of photography at the 
expense of that of its aesthetic or artistic role. 
According to the orthodox view, photographs, in 
comparison with other pictures, are particularly 
good sources of knowledge about the things they 
depict because they are produced by mechanical 
processes that are independent of photographers’ 
beliefs, while drawings and other non-photo-
graphic pictures are produced by processes that 
essentially implicate their makers’ beliefs. Photo-
graphs alone are therefore immune to inaccuracies 
that result from the false beliefs of their makers. 
In On Photography, Costello charts the long his-
tory of this view, showing how theorising about 
photography has been informed by a conviction 
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in its «non-human» dimension from the 1830s 
to the present day. His illuminating discussion 
reveals the role and influence of that conviction in 
the theories of early writers on photography such 
as Eastlake, Emerson, Stieglitz, Demachy, Evans, 
through to modernists such as Weston, Adams, 
Benjamin and Kracauer, on to their successors 
Cavell and Bazin, and ultimately to contemporary 
philosophers such as Scruton, Currie and Walton.
The contemporary incarnation of this convic-
tion in the theories of Scruton and Walton construes 
photographs as pictorial representations which track 
the features of the things they depict independently 
of photographers’ beliefs. Belief-independent feature 
tracking involves the counterfactual dependence 
of the appearance of a photograph on the appear-
ance of the scene it depicts at the moment at which 
and from the point of view from which the photo-
graph was taken. If the scene had been different, the 
resulting photograph too would have been differ-
ent, and it would have been different quite indepen-
dently of whether or not the differences in the scene 
made a difference to the photographer’s beliefs. On 
this construal, paintings and drawings differ from 
photographs because, while they too often track the 
features of the things they depict, they do so only 
because their makers’ beliefs change with the fea-
tures of the things they depict.
A range of objections to the claim that photo-
graphs are belief-independent feature trackers are 
likely to spring immediately to the mind of those 
with even a scant knowledge of photography. For 
example, techniques such as dodging and burn-
ing can be used to produce photographs that do 
not track the features of the things they depict 
independently of their makers’ beliefs. However, 
orthodox views deal with such apparent coun-
terexamples by denying that these techniques are 
genuinely photographic. Rather, orthodox theo-
rists claim, these techniques betray the influence 
of painting and other non-photographic depictive 
techniques on practices of making photographs. 
Pure photography eschews such techniques and, as 
a result, precludes the influence of beliefs.
While orthodox views accommodate the epis-
temic import we ascribe to photographs, they lead 
to scepticism about their status as art, on the plau-
sible assumption that works of art must be capable 
of expressing the thoughts of the individual agents 
who produce them. If photographs track the fea-
tures of the scenes, they depict independently of 
their makers’ beliefs then they cannot express their 
makers’ thoughts in virtue of how they depict what 
they depict. They may yet be capable of express-
ing their makers’ thoughts insofar as their makers’ 
choices of scenes to be photographed express their 
thoughts. In this case, however, the worry is that 
the resultant photographs express those thoughts 
merely in virtue of what they depict, not in virtue 
of the way in which they depict it, with the result 
that viewers’ interest is not really in the photo-
graphs themselves, but solely in the things those 
photographs depict. Photographs themselves are 
merely means of accessing their subjects and, as 
such, are in principle dispensable.
The orthodox view therefore seems to support 
the view that there are no photographic works of 
art (that is, photographs that are art considered as 
photographs). Lopes lays out the sceptical argu-
ment for this conclusion as follows:
(S1) a pure photograph is an image that 
depicts only by belief-independent feature-track-
ing, and
(S2) if a pure photograph is an image that 
depicts only by belief-independent feature-track-
ing, then there can be no interest in it as a depic-
tively expressed thought, but
(S3) an image is a representational art work 
only if there can be an interest in it as a depictive-
ly expressed thought,
(S4) so no pure photograph is a representa-
tional art work, but
(S5) photography is an art only if some pure 
photographs are representational art works,
(S6) so photography is not an art (Lopes 
[2016]: 17).
2. Photography is an art
That the orthodox construal of photography 
seems to lead to the denial that photography is 
an art form suggests a fundamental problem with 
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the orthodox construal. For, as Lopes and Costello 
both rightly insist, it is a datum that photography 
is an art, to which a look around any major art 
gallery will attest. So, what is wrong with it?
The sceptical argument just outlined appears 
to leave those who wish to defend the artistic sta-
tus of photography with two options: either they 
can take issue with the assumption that art’s val-
ue lies in its ability to express human thought, or 
they can take issue with the claim that photogra-
phy essentially involves belief-independent feature 
tracking. As Costello notes, this second claim is 
open to challenge. Not every photograph tracks 
the features of the scene it depicts independently 
of the photographer’s beliefs. He gives the example 
of Lee Friedlander’s Stems, a series of photographs 
of flower stems in vases with shallow depth of field 
(Costello [2018]: 120-121). It is simply not the case 
that, had there been an extra stem at the back of a 
given photographed vase, the resultant photograph 
would correspondingly have been different since, 
given the depth of field, the photograph would 
have remained the same. The only way it would 
have differed would have been if Friedlander had 
noticed the extra stem and decided to render it 
visible in the resultant photograph by amend-
ing the depth of field accordingly. But in this case, 
the resultant photograph tracks the features of the 
scene only because of an alteration to Friedlander’s 
beliefs and intentions. Moreover, in this case, our 
interest in Friedlander’s photograph doesn’t drop 
through to the vase photographed, since there is 
no guarantee that we would ourselves have noticed 
the extra stem had we seen the vase in the flesh.
Secondly, even if, pace Costello, photographs 
did track the features of their objects indepen-
dently of photographers’ beliefs, this fact wouldn’t 
capture what is unique about them. As Lopes 
argues, belief-independent feature tracking isn’t 
the exclusive domain of photography. Many, but 
not all, drawing processes involve belief-independ-
ent feature tracking. In drawing, as Lopes notes 
elsewhere, it is possible «to draw something, guid-
ed by the look of that thing, and to produce a rec-
ognizable aspect of it, without having a concept of 
it» (Lopes [1996]: 186).
Nevertheless, these problems with the ortho-
dox view do little to help us to identify what is 
distinctive of photography, or to gain insight into 
the distinctive nature of the art form of photogra-
phy. In Four Arts of Photography, Dominic Lopes 
sets out to identify the conditions under which 
photography constitutes an art, distinguishing (as 
his title suggests) four different arts of photog-
raphy. He proposes to identify each of these arts 
by adopting a «method of isolation», treating the 
falsity of each of the substantive premises of the 
sceptic’s argument, S1, S2, S3 and S5, as a guide to 
an art of photography (Lopes [2016]: 35).
Photographic art in the «classical tradition» 
reveals the falsity of S3, since it is a source of 
interest as representational art, despite its failure 
to depictively express photographers’ thoughts. 
Our interest in such photographic art derives 
instead from its revealing the world to be a way 
that direct experience of the world does not reveal 
it to be.
The photographic art Lopes calls «cast pho-
tography» reveals the falsity of S2. Cast photogra-
phy involves two distinct levels of depiction. Cast 
photographs have both an object (the thing pho-
tographed) and a subject (something further that 
is represented in virtue of that thing’s being pho-
tographed). They are able depictively to represent 
thoughts because, to represent a subject, they need 
not represent an object that represents that sub-
ject. Our interest in cast photographs therefore 
does not «drop through» to their objects.
«Lyric photography», Lopes argues, under-
mines S1 because many of its exemplars depict by 
belief-dependent feature tracking. On his character-
isation, lyric photography thematizes the process-
es and procedures of photography by employing 
diverse forms of mark making to produce visual 
images from the photographic event. He discusses 
the particular example of Gerhard Richter’s Betty, 
produced by projecting slide images projected onto 
canvas, tracing the outline of the projected image 
and then painting it in. Richter himself conceives 
of this process of making photographs by painting, 
rather than of producing paintings of or imitations 
of photographs. Lopes agrees. He says
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Betty is literally a photograph – one completed by 
painting. Insofar as mark-making is done under the 
control of information recorded in the photographic 
event, it sidesteps the kind of subjectivity that over-
plays personal experience. At the same time, painting 
and traditional photographic printing stand shoulder 
to shoulder as methods for making marks. Neither is 
more photographic than the other, though they dif-
fer enough in their comportment and impact (Lopes 
[2016]: 90).
Earlier, he says «What makes an image a draw-
ing is that its surface is marked by means of cer-
tain bodily movements. Drawing and photography 
are not mutually exclusive. Information from a 
photographic recording event might guide bodily 
movements to mark a surface. The resulting image 
is both a photograph and a drawing» (Lopes 
[2016]: 85).
Lopes’s final art of photography, abstraction, 
undermines S5’s denial of the existence of abstract 
photographic art. Abstract photographic works 
represent, but their representational character is 
not responsible for their status as art, since their 
depictive content is not the focus of our apprecia-
tive attention. Particular photographs may exhibit 
more than one of these four arts of photography, 
and thus there will be a variety of further, hybrid 
photographic arts. Nevertheless, by concentrating 
on these four photographic arts, Lopes hopes both 
to illuminate the conditions under which photo-
graphs are art and to show the error of the scep-
tic’s argument.
3. The New Theory of Photography 
One in the grip of the orthodox theory is most 
likely to take issue with the claim that lyric pho-
tography, of all these arts, is a genuinely photo-
graphic art. What are Lopes’s grounds for claim-
ing that it is purely photographic? Answering this 
question requires a positive account of what dis-
tinguishes photographs from paintings and draw-
ings. Both Lopes’s and Costello’s accounts of the 
nature of photography draw on and develop a new 
theory of photography, suggested by the work of 
Patrick Maynard and Dawn Wilson (nee Phillips) 
(Maynard, Phillips). Maynard construes photogra-
phy as a set of a mark-making technologies which 
harness the effects of light on various surfaces to 
enable sensitized surfaces to be marked through 
the action of light. Wilson teases out what is com-
mon among these technologies to provide an 
account of what distinguishes photography from 
the mark-making processes involved in paint-
ing and drawing. On her view, what is distinctive 
about the photographic process is that it involves 
a photographic event: an event in which the infor-
mation carried by a light image is recorded and 
stored. A photographic event is not by itself suf-
ficient to produce a photograph: this requires the 
information that is recorded and stored to be pro-
cessed so as to produce a visual image.
Costello points out that, when thinking about 
photographs and photography, we tend to con-
ceive of either one or the other entirely passive-
ly: either we conceive of photography solely as a 
means of producing photographs, or we think of 
photographs solely as the products of a process of 
photography (Costello [2018]: 8). The new theory 
characterises the process of photography actively, 
by appeal to its inclusion of a photographic event. 
On the new theory, only the photographic event is 
intrinsically photographic. In allowing the infor-
mation recorded by a photographic event to be 
processed in of a variety of different ways so as to 
produce a visual image, the new theory empha-
sises the opportunities that photographers have 
to control their actions, in a way that depends on 
their beliefs, and displays skill and intelligence.
In doing so, the new theory provides an 
important corrective to the orthodox view, which 
often works with an impoverished and incorrect 
implicit conception of the process of producing 
photographs as one all of the important stages 
of which are completed the moment the shutter 
release button is pressed. However, whether or not 
the new theory establishes that lyric photographs 
such as Richter’s are genuine instances of photo-
graphic art depends crucially on how it is further 
elaborated.
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4. Restrictive or permissive?
Costello distinguishes restrictive from per-
missive versions of the new theory. Whether a 
variant of this approach is restrictive or permis-
sive depends on what restrictions, if any, it places 
on the process whereby a visual image is formed 
from information recorded and stored in a photo-
graphic event. Restrictive versions of the new the-
ory disagree with the traditional view’s claim that 
all photographs involve belief independent fea-
ture tracking. However, they agree with tradition 
insofar as they take the processes whereby visual 
images are produced from the information record-
ed and stored during the photographic event to be 
such that photographs typically track the features 
of their objects independently of their makers’ 
beliefs.
By contrast, permissive versions of the new 
theory place few if any constraints on the nature 
of these processes. Because, for new theories, the 
work of distinguishing photographic from non-
photographic processes is done by the appeal to a 
photographic event, they can allow that the sub-
sequent processes of image production may be 
indistinguishable from those involved in other 
image-making processes such as painting and 
drawing. The result is that photographs need not 
even typically be belief independent feature track-
ers. As Costello puts it, according to permissive 
new theories, «Belief-independent feature tracking 
does not parse between photography and paint-
ing, but between the automatic and non-automatic 
processes to be found in both» (Costello [2018]: 
87).
It looks as if only permissive versions of the 
new theory construe lyric photography as a cen-
tral photographic art form, since restrictive ver-
sions classify lyric photographs as atypical instanc-
es of photography. As one would therefore expect, 
Lopes’s own version of the new theory is permis-
sive. On his construal of what a photograph is: «A 
photograph is an image output by a mark-making 
process taking input from an electro-chemical 
event that records information from a light image 
of a pro-photographic scene» (Lopes [2016]: 81).
Stated in this way, his view is extremely per-
missive, because it places no restrictions what-
ever on the mark-making process that takes input 
from the electro-chemical event. Its permissive-
ness seems to be borne out by his subsequent dis-
cussion of Richter’s Betty and his claim that it is 
a genuine photograph. On his view, a photograph 
might be completed by drawing (or painting), 
resulting in something which is both a photograph 
and a drawing (painting).
Costello, however, has some reservations about 
Lopes’s version of the new theory. He asks us to 
consider the following case:
Using an opaque projector, Richter projects a photo-
graph of Kölner Dom onto the surface of a canvas, 
traces its outlines, then sets about painting in the 
image. Almost finished, he begins «blurring» the like-
ness thereby created, by dragging solvent across its wet 
surface. Applying more and more solvent, but still not 
happy, he eventually resorts either to scraping away 
the image entirely or dragging fresh paint across the 
canvas with an outsized silkscreen blade. The result-
ing image is a largely monochromatic gray abstract 
with residual traces of other colours and some fac-
ture. How should we understand it: is it as a paint-
ing, a photograph, or both? In one obvious sense it is 
a painting: it is made by applying oils to a stretched 
linen support, and it can be placed within a lineage 
of abstraction and the monochrome. But it also impli-
cates a photographic event in its causal history. Like 
Betty, it originates in a photographic event to which 
further imaging processes have been applied. So 
described, there is little to distinguish them conceptu-
ally. But if it is still a photograph, what is it a photo-
graph of? Can it really be described as a photograph 
of Kölner Dom? (Costello [2018]: 94).
Costello’s implicit answer to this question is 
«no». However, on Lopes’s account, the Kölner 
Dom is clearly a photograph. This is made clear 
by his claim that «The new theory of photogra-
phy does not require that photographic processing 
preserve most, or much, information recorded in 
the photographic event» (Lopes [2016]: 123-124). 
Lopes’s version of the new theory, Costello sug-
gests, is too permissive. I agree. Costello suggests 
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making it less permissive by placing an experien-
tial or appreciative condition on what suffices to 
count as a photograph of x (Costello [2018]: 95). 
As he elaborates this suggestion, it requires that, 
for Richter’s imaginary painting to also be a pho-
tograph, viewers be able to see something that 
could be the cathedral in its surface. If its photo-
graphic genesis no longer bears on its appreciation 
in any way, he argues, the canvas is not a photo-
graph but merely a monochrome painting.
It is in fact possible to distinguish two dis-
tinct suggestions in what Costello says here. The 
first is that we add an additional requirement to 
Lopes’s theory that, for a mark-making process 
taking input from an electro-chemical event that 
records information from a light image of a pro-
photographic scene to yield a photograph, it must 
recognisably (or potentially recognisably) depict 
that scene. The second is that we add an addi-
tional requirement to Lopes’s theory that, for a 
mark-making process taking input from an elec-
tro-chemical event that records information from 
a light image of a pro-photographic scene to yield 
a photograph, the photographic genesis of the 
resultant visual image should bear on its apprecia-
tion.
I think we should reject the first of these sug-
gestions but endorse something akin to the sec-
ond. There are two reasons for which we should 
reject the first suggestion, which effectively ties 
something’s being a photograph of some object or 
scene to its depicting that object or scene. Firstly, 
it is an advantage of new theories of photography 
that they divorce a visual image’s being a photo-
graph from its depicting the pro-photographic 
scene involved in its production. This enables 
them to accommodate abstract photography, as 
Lopes wants to do. (Wilson’s version requires 
that photographs allow the viewer to learn about 
the nature of the photographic event, but she 
stops short of insisting that they do so by depict-
ing it). New theories can hold that there is some-
thing abstract photographs are of, in the sense 
that there is something light reflected from which 
played a causal role in the generation of the result-
ant visual image. However, what makes them 
abstract, rather than representational, is that they 
do not depict the things they are of in this sense. 
Secondly, this first suggestion does not solve the 
problem with Lopes’s account. Imagine that Rich-
ter engaged in the process that Costello describes, 
but then, faced with a largely monochromatic gray 
abstract became disheartened with the result and 
so retraced from memory the outlines of the Köl-
ner Dom that had been projected onto the canvas 
and coloured them in, ending up with something 
very similar to the image he had before he started 
the blurring process. Is the resultant image a pho-
tograph? Surely not! However, Costello’s first sug-
gestion does nothing to preclude its being one. 
Turning to the second suggestion, how then 
should we understand the requirement that the 
photographic genesis of the resultant visual image 
should bear on its appreciation? An idea of how 
we should construe it comes from Lopes’s claim 
that «Only photographs are images that are made 
by a process that involves a photographic record-
ing event. No other kind of image is defined as 
conveying information from the recording event» 
(Lopes [2016]: 98, emphasis mine). This quote 
suggests that Lopes is perhaps not so permissive 
as he elsewhere appears to be.
Lopes endorses Dretske’s notion of informa-
tion carrying (Lopes [2016]: 95-96). On Dret-
ske’s view, the informational content of a signal is 
determined by the dependency relations it exhibits 
(Dretske [1981]). Two signals, one dependent on 
the other, carry the same information about some 
state of affairs or source on which each depends, 
so long as both carry the same amount of infor-
mation about that source. The chain of signals 
linked by such dependency relations comprises a 
communication system, whose output carries infor-
mation about its source in virtue of these depend-
ency relations, which enable information to flow 
from one signal to the next in the chain. Every 
communication system depends on a communi-
cation channel over which information is carried. 
Any signal on the chain that makes up a commu-
nication system depends on factors other than the 
previous signal in the chain. For a communication 
channel to work effectively to carry information 
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about its source, the various signals that make it 
up must either generate only redundant infor-
mation about the source or generate no relevant 
information.
A necessary condition for the photographic 
genesis of a visual image to bear on its apprecia-
tion is that it carries information from the record-
ing event. However, as things stand, this require-
ment is insufficient. It explains why Costello’s 
imaginary Richter example is not a photograph, 
but it does not explain why my revised Richter 
example is not. In this example, the visual image 
carries information from the recording event. It 
does so because there is a communication sys-
tem linking the recording event, via the image 
originally projected on the canvas and then via 
Richter’s memory, to the recreated image, such 
that Richter’s recreated image carries information 
about the Kölner Dom.
This suggests that we need to further restrict 
how genuinely photographic processes must car-
ry information about their photographic events. 
One obvious suggestion is that they must do so 
via belief-independent communication systems. 
This would yield a very restrictive version of the 
new theory (although it would be more permissive 
than the tradition theory in its ability to accom-
modate Friedlander’s Stems). In any case, I think 
it is false. I am tempted to agree with Lopes that 
Richter’s Betty is a photograph but want to resist 
any suggestion that my revised Kölner Dom 
example (call it Kölner Dom) is a photograph. 
What is the difference? It isn’t that Betty is pro-
duced by belief-independent processes, but Köl-
ner Dom is not. I find it most unlikely that Betty 
carries information about the person (Betty) 
whom it depicts belief independently. The pro-
cess of tracing the outlines of the projected image 
may be belief independent, but that of selecting 
the colours of paint with which to fill it in sure-
ly is not (it involves judgements of the form «this 
part of the projected image is the same colour as 
that paint»). The difference is rather that Richter’s 
memory is unlikely to function sufficiently effec-
tively as a communication channel for informa-
tion about the Kölner Dom. By contrast, despite 
its dependence on the artist’s beliefs, the process 
of tracing the outlines of a projected image and 
colouring it in by matching the colours of the 
image to colours of paint is, in general, an effec-
tive channel for carrying information about the 
details of the visual appearances of things. I there-
fore propose modifying Lopes’s account as follows:
a photograph is an image output by a mark-making 
process that carries information from an electro-
chemical event that records information from a 
light image of a pro-photographic scene and does so 
through a communication channel of a type that is 
effective at carrying such information.
The proposed modification appeals to types of 
communication channels rather than to individual 
communication channels because an individual 
communication channel’s being effective at carry-
ing information of the relevant kind does not suf-
fice to make the image in question a photograph. 
Suppose that Richter himself has an extraordinar-
ily good memory. It nevertheless seems false to 
say that his Kölner Dom is a photograph while an 
image produced in the same way by an artist with 
a poorer memory would not be.
There are further issues that need to be 
resolved if this modification is yield a satisfactory 
account of photography. Firstly, just how effective 
must a communication channel be to form part 
of a genuinely photographic process? Efficacy is 
to be measured in terms of the amount of infor-
mation that must be successfully communicated 
(that must not be lost). Although it is critical to 
the plausibility of the proposal, it is not clear how 
to answer this question in a non-arbitrary way. 
However that question is answered, though, the 
modified account is likely to be more restrictive 
than Lopes’s original, since communication chan-
nels that track features independently of beliefs 
are likely to be more effective information carriers 
than belief-dependent communication channels. 
The challenge, to the restrictive and the permissive 
new theorist alike, is to show that the required 
level of effectiveness can be specified in a way that 
accommodates the belief-dependence of at least 
some photographic mark making processes.
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5. The epistemic import of photography
How does the new theorist, restrictive or per-
missive, propose to accommodate the epistemic 
importance of photographs? Lopes proposes to do 
so by appeal to social norms. He argues that dif-
ferent photographic practices are subject to dif-
ferent social norms which are more or less strict 
in ensuring that photographs convey information 
from the pro-photographic scene (Lopes [2016]: 
110). This does not distinguish photography from 
other forms of image making. Just as some draw-
ing practices (e.g. court room drawing) are subject 
to norms which reward accuracy and punish inac-
curacy and thereby help ensure that court room 
drawing as a practice is an effective epistemic tool, 
so too are some photographic practices. Moreo-
ver, just as other drawing practices are subject to 
artistic norms which are not aimed at ensuring 
that drawings serve epistemic aims, so too some 
photographic practices are subject to social norms 
which serve artistic rather than epistemic aims. 
On this explanation, the social norms themselves 
play an important role in explaining the epistemic 
role some photography practices play. According 
to Lopes, those norms restrict the photographic 
practices at issue, ensuring belief-independent 
feature tracking (Lopes [2016]: 111). As with tra-
ditional theories, belief-independent feature track-
ing plays a role in explaining the epistemic impor-
tance of some photographic practices, on Lopes’s 
view. The difference is that belief-independence 
isn’t built into the nature of photography but 
imposed on it from the outside by social norms.
Costello worries whether belief-independent 
feature tracking should occupy even this more 
modest place in an explanation of photography’s 
epistemic value. He notes that some mark-making 
practices, such as the digital manipulation of col-
our and other values in diagnostic, medical and 
astrological photography flout belief-independent 
feature tracking but that, in doing so, they may aid 
the extraction of the sought-after information, by 
making the presence of particular features easier 
to identify (Costello [2018]: 135). I agree. It is not 
necessary to appeal to belief-independent feature 
tracking, whether socially established or not, to 
explain the epistemic value of some photographic 
practices.
On my proposed modification of Lopes’s 
account, all photographs carry information about 
the photographic events causally involved in their 
production and thus about the pro-photograph-
ic scenes information about which those events 
record. This is a fact about them quite independ-
ent of the social norms that govern them. While 
this is true of all photographs, not all photographs 
are equally epistemically valuable. We ascribe epis-
temic value to those photographs that meet two 
further conditions. Firstly, we value those pho-
tographs that carry information the pro-photo-
graphic scenes involved in their production in 
depictive form. Every photograph is an image, but 
not every photograph is a picture. Pictorially-con-
veyed information is useful to us because it is par-
ticularly easy to extract.
Secondly, we value those photographs that car-
ry information about the pro-photographic scenes 
involved in their production through communica-
tion channels that we recognise as being effective 
at carrying such information. Any communica-
tion channel belongs to a variety of different types 
(e.g. one involving belief-dependent processes, one 
dependent on beliefs only about type identity of 
colours, one dependent only on Gerhard Richter’s 
beliefs about type identity of colours). Communi-
cation channels of some of the types to which it 
belongs may be more effective at carrying infor-
mation from a light image of a pro-photographic 
scene than others. Of course, none of this affects 
how effective the communication channel at issue 
actually is. However, the type to which it most 
saliently belongs affects how effective we take it to 
be and thus the epistemic import we attribute to 
it. Here, social norms do play an important role. 
Social norms of image production help deter-
mine the kinds of photographic processes that are 
employed and thus the types of processes that are 
salient to us. They are thus important in securing 
our recognition that a type of information carry-
ing process is reliable (whether it involves belief-
independent feature tracking or not) and thus in 
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leading us to trust photographs of certain kinds 
for epistemic purposes. However, those norms, 
pace Lopes, need not do so by imposing additional 
constraints that are actually responsible for their 
reliability.
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Abstract. In his recent book On Photography, Diarmuid Cos-
tello raises two objections against the restrictive or weak version 
of the New Theory of Photography and recommends – albeit 
with some reservations – the radical New Theory proposed by 
Dominic Lopes in his Four Arts of Photography. In this paper, 
I respond to Costello’s criticisms suggesting that, at least in two 
respects, the purported restrictive view might be more progres-
sive – and preferable – than the radical one.
Keywords. Photography, New Theory, photographic processes, 
definition, photographic means.
In the last few years there has been a resur-
gence of the philosophical literature on photog-
raphy. For decades, analytic philosophers of art 
focused on discussing, commenting and object-
ing what came to be the orthodox view on pho-
tography. A view that, drawing from the Gricean 
theory of communication and the causal theory of 
perception, distinguished sharply between pictures 
that meant naturally, i.e. photographs, and pictures 
that meant non-naturally, i.e. paintings, drawings 
and etchings. The essence of photography was tak-
en to be its purported distinctive way of represent-
ing, i.e. by means of a causal and counterfactual 
relation with a real object or event that was inde-
pendent of beliefs or intentional mental states of 
the photographer. And this essence was what, for 
many philosophers, defined the nature of photog-
raphy and what distinguished it from other kinds 
of pictures. But new times have come. Or at least 
that is the promise. A new wave of philosophy of 
photography, what has been called The New The-
ory, is an attempt to change the terms of discus-
sion, move on, and leave behind once and for all 
the old debates.
Now the new theory comes in two different 
velocities: there is a first (weaker and more con-
servative) wave, what Diarmuid Costello calls in 
his book, On Photography, «the restrictive new 
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theory» and a second, more daring and progressive 
tsunami: «the radical new theory» put forward and 
systematized by Dominic Lopes in his Four Arts of 
Photography and favored, with some reservations, 
by Costello as well.
In this paper, I will first provide a short intro-
duction of the orthodox view – the view that both 
Costello and Lopes oppose to in their respective 
books – and then focus on some specific issues I 
find problematic. In particular, I will focus on two 
objections Costello raises against the weak version 
of the New theory and will try to persuade the 
reader that, in fact, when more carefully consid-
ered, the purported restrictive view is, at least in 
some respects, more progressive than the radical 
view. Of course, what is important is not so much 
if it is more progressive or not, but if it provides 
a better or more reasonable framework to under-
stand the practice of photography. I claim that it 
does. In particular, I will argue (1) that some of 
the objections Costello raises against the restric-
tive version are issues that the view can actu-
ally accommodate. Moreover, contrary to what 
Costello claims, this view does not prescribe an 
implausible and restrictive notion of what counts 
as a photograph. In fact, it does not provide any 
definition of what a photograph is. And here it 
is where, I think, the view is more progressive 
and recommendable than the more radical ver-
sion proposed by Lopes. (2) I will argue that we 
should dispense with trying to give an account of 
what counts as «a photograph» in terms of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions however broad and 
unrestrictive they are – which is, I think, what 
the radical view does. After all, one of the marks 
of the New theory is to put the emphasis on the 
photographic process rather than on finding a 
definition of what a photograph is. Furthermore, 
(3) I will argue that the notion of «photographic 
means» or what is distinctive of photography that 
the purported restrictive view proposes is actually 
less restrictive than the one proposed by the radi-
cal view. The emphasis on the notion of the pho-
tographic event as the only phenomenon which is 
distinctively photographic is, I think, problematic 
and inaccurate. Also, it takes us back to the ortho-
dox way of thinking about photography. It is true 
that the restrictive theory concedes various points 
to the orthodox account, but I think this should 
not discredit the view. Being radical is always an 
appealing option, but in some cases, as Aristotle 
recommends, the middle point is the most virtu-
ous state. Or in more photographic terms, grey 
might well be the new black.
1. The orthodox view and the development of the New The-
ory
Broadly construed, the trademark of the 
orthodox view in the analytic philosophy of pho-
tography is the radical, ontological, distinction it 
makes between photography and other pictorial 
representations, as well as the emphasis it puts on 
the epistemic advantages and phenomenological 
differences of the former in comparison to the lat-
ter. In fact, as Costello and Lopes carefully explain 
in their books, the so-called contemporary ortho-
doxy is a systematized version of ideas in circula-
tion since the origins of photography. It reflects 
the intuition, present in the writing of theorists 
such as Eastman, Stieglitz, Emerson, Bazin, Bar-
thes, or Cavell among others, that photographic 
images are intrinsically connected with the real. 
This connection, moreover, according to the 
orthodoxy, has to do with the automatism and the 
mechanic nature of the photographic device.
In its more modern and philosophical for-
mulation, the central idea is that photographs are 
a case of natural meaning – á lá Grice – while 
other pictorial representations are cases of non-
natural meaning (Walton [1984]; Currie [1990]). 
What defines a photographic image is a «natu-
ral», merely causal and counterfactual, connection 
not mediated by the mind or beliefs of an agent, 
between a real object and a photosensitive mate-
rial. Obtaining other pictorial representations, by 
contrast, necessarily requires the mediation of an 
intentional agent (Scruton [1981]; Walton [1984]; 
Currie [1990]). This merely causal connection 
with the object is what determines the subject 
of the representation, and it is ultimately what 
defines what a photograph is. For the vast major-
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ity of philosophers that follow this line of thought, 
all this results in an epistemic advantage of pho-
tographs with respect to other images: the causal 
relation guarantees that photographs are reli-
able belief-independent feature trackers of objects 
and scenes of the world. Now, for the more radi-
cal wing of the orthodoxy – what Costello calls 
the skeptics – this specifically photographic form 
of representation has three consequences. First, 
it entails that images that are not the product of 
this unmediated, mere causal relation, are not pure 
photographs. That is, any intentional interven-
tion brings images closer to paintings (Scruton 
[1981]).1 Second, this conception of photography 
sets limits to the artistic capacity of the medium, 
for the artistic capacity of a medium requires 
intentional agency to instill a thought in the image 
(Scruton [1981]; Hopkins [2010]). Finally, it pre-
vents photographs from representing fictional 
entities by purely photographic means. Because, 
obviously, what does not exist cannot causally 
interact with a photosensitive surface (Scruton 
[1981]; Currie [2008]; Friday [1997]; Cavedon-
Taylor [2010]).
This is the tradition against which the New 
theory reacts. If the emphasis of the orthodoxy 
was to define the nature of photography in radical 
opposition to other pictorial types by means of an 
epistemic framework, the New theory – especially 
in its more radical version – downplays the pur-
ported epistemic advantages of photography and 
aims at highlighting the artistic potential of the 
medium.2 This, in turn, places photography – both 
1 Scruton holds that if a photographer proceeds «to paint 
things in and out, retouch, alter or pasticher as he pleas-
es […] the photographer becomes a painter» (Scruton 
[1981]: 593).
2 This emphasis on the artistic potential of photography is 
stressed in both Lopes’ and Costello’s books, but it might 
be more evident in Lopes’ Four Arts of Photography. As 
its title suggests one of the aims – if not the main aim – 
of Lopes’s book is to account for various ways in which 
photography may become art. In fact, he uses the skep-
tical argument against the artistic capacity of photogra-
phy as a methodological tool to explain different ways 
in which, contrary to the skeptic, photography can be 
artistically valuable. For an overview and a short critical 
epistemically and artistically – in a continuum 
with other forms of pictorial representation.
Now, as I mentioned earlier, the New theory 
developed in two stages. The motivation behind 
the first wave of the new theory was mainly to 
challenge the orthodox view regarding what 
counts as a photographic representation or what 
counts as representing photographically or by pho-
tographic means.
In what proved to be a very influential paper, 
Dawn Wilson (nee Phillips) challenged the idea 
that a causal relation in and of itself could deter-
mine the subject of a photograph, or what a photo-
graph represents or depicts, thereby attacking one 
of the main tenets of the orthodox theory. If we 
claim, Wilson argued, that
the photographic relation is merely causal, then we 
would not find ourselves wondering how to explain 
any relation between the photograph and its «subject». 
This would be the same mistake as thinking that a line 
of debris washed up on a beach stands in a relation 
to a subject: namely the tide […]. Insofar as a photo-
graph has a subject, then the subject is not determined 
solely by the causal relation (Phillips [2009]: 330-31).
Knowledge of the causal process, Wilson argues, 
grants us insight into the medium of a photograph, 
rather than its subject-matter. But the causal process 
of photography is much more complex than what 
the orthodox theory takes it to be, and that is what 
we have to understand if we want to make sense of 
«the peculiarly distinctive nature of photography». 
What distinguishes photographs from other picto-
rial kinds, Wilson further claims, is their distinctive 
causal history which she characterizes thus:
1. a light image is formed, using objects and 
light sources in an ordinary state of affairs;
2. a photographic event occurs – no photo-
graph yet exists;  
3. the information recorded and stored under-
goes a process to create a visual image  (the photo-
graph) or several such images;  
review of Lopes’ book see Atencia-Linares (2018a). For a 
short summary and critical analysis of Costello’s book see 
Atencia-Linares (2018b).
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4. the appearance of the photograph leads the 
viewer to learn about the photographic event.  
While the orthodoxy seems to reduce the 
nature of the photographic image to what Wilson 
calls the photographic event – which they charac-
terize in merely causal terms – Wilson, follow-
ing Patrick Maynard (2005), emphasizes the fact 
that, at this stage of the process, there is, strictly 
speaking, no image. To obtain a proper photo-
graphic image, Wilson holds, further processes 
are required, and these processes typically involve 
intentional agency.
This more nuanced and less reductivist charac-
terization of the photographic process, motivated 
other theorists to extend this line of investigation.
I, for example, drawing on Wilson’s characteri-
zation of the photographic process, challenged the 
traditional idea of what counts as representation 
by photographic means in order to argue against 
the purported limitation of photography when 
it comes to represent fictional entities (Atencia-
Linares [2012]).3 Against the orthodox idea that a 
representation by purely photographic means con-
sists of a belief-independent feature-tracking caus-
al relation, I proposed that what is specific to pho-
tography is the exploitation, control and manipu-
lation of light and its effects at every stage of the 
process and not only at the moment of the shot. 
Following this line of thought, the proposal is to 
understand the notion of representation by strictly 
photographic means in this way:
Photographic means: any action or technique per-
formed or taking place during the production of an 
image, including the stages of transduction and stor-
ing, that consists solely in the exploitation, manipula-
tion, or control of the incidence of light onto, and its 
interaction with, a photosensitive material (Atencia-
Linares [2012]: 22)4.
3 The motivation of this paper, as I will explain below, was 
not to propose a definition of photography. Rather, the 
purpose of the paper was to give an account of what it is 
to represent by photographic means.
4 Transduction here means the process of transforming 
the latent information registered after the photographic 
event into one or many patent images.
The exploitation, manipulation and control of 
the incidence of light onto the photosensitive sur-
face can occur automatically and thereby without 
any intentional mediation. Moreover, given the 
technology of a vast majority photographic devic-
es it is possible that this is typically the case – and 
here I make a concession to the orthodoxy. How-
ever, this description in no way excludes the possi-
bility of an intentional mediation. What is specific 
to photography is the production of images by 
means of the incidence of light, not the automa-
tism or the independence of mental states in pro-
duction of the image. This, I argue, helps us see 
why photographs can indeed represent ficta by 
strictly photographic means: in many occasions 
photographers can manipulate and control the 
incidence of light to obtain non-realistic images.5
2. WNT: too restrictive?
The first wave of the New Theory laid the 
groundwork for a new line of investigation: the 
essence of photography is not a form of repre-
sentation in virtue of a belief-independent caus-
al relation and a photograph is not necessarily 
the consequence of such causal natural relation. 
The photographic process is more complex and 
involves more than the shot of a camera. Moreo-
ver, the purported photographic means are more 
related to the exposure, control and manipulation 
of light than to a notion of natural causation.
Nonetheless, Diarmuid Costello argues in his 
book that, although the animus of this first wave 
of the new theory was on the right track, the pro-
posals are still too restrictive. In particular, Cos-
tello claims that my view of what should be con-
sidered strictly photographic is too limited: «Aten-
cia-Linares’s definition only recognizes a subset 
of such processes as strictly photographic. By 
singling out the control of light’s interaction with 
photosensitive materials it rules in some, but not 
5 Since the argument of how or why photographs can rep-
resent ficta by photographic means is not relevant for the 
current discussion, I do not include a detailed explana-
tion. To expand on this, see Atencia-Linares (2012).
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all, of the things that photographers typically do 
in the darkroom» (Costello [2018]: 85).
Also, according to Costello, from this notion 
of what counts as strictly photographic follows a 
definition of the nature of photography that is too 
prescriptive and inadequate.
Such prohibitions distinguish what is photographic 
from what is not in arbitrary ways. [...] Is the pho-
tographer obliged to take the more circuitous route, 
should they want their work to count as pure? It is 
hard to see why they should. From where would such 
prohibitions or prescriptions derive their normative 
force? It is not for philosophy, but first order practice 
and its criticism, to determine what counts as a pho-
tograph (Costello [2018]: 86-87).
Partly for these reasons, Costello argues, the 
radical version of the New Theory (RNT) is a bet-
ter choice.
In what follows, I will discuss in more detail 
the two objections Costello raises against the 
WNT. Then, in the following section, I will devel-
op some important aspects of the RNT to assess 
whether it is in fact, as Costello claims, a better 
option.
Let me now examine the first objection, name-
ly, the idea that the definition of what counts as 
strictly photographic according for the WNT 
excludes as photographic various processes that 
are frequently used in current photographic prac-
tice.
Costello’s objection consists of a series of cases 
that involve techniques commonly used in pho-
tographic practice that, according to Costello, are 
excluded as strictly photographic in my proposal. I 
will cite these cases and give some answers.
Case I:
Imagine a photographer who wants to inhibit the 
exposure of some part of an image while printing. 
If she does this by cutting a paper mask to occlude 
that area of the negative or uses some kind of baffle 
(including her hands) to shield the relevant area of 
the unexposed paper («dodging»), this will count as 
making an image by strictly photographic means, as 
both are means of controlling the interaction of light 
with a photosensitive material. But if a more expedi-
ent or accurate way to achieve the same result were 
to paint an opaque masking agent onto the negative’s 
emulsion it is not clear that this would also count 
(Costello [2018]: 85-86).
If I understand it correctly, the idea that Cos-
tello suggests is that the application of the mask-
ing agent would keep a particular section of the 
image from the action of developing chemicals, 
thereby not allowing that section of the latent 
image to become visible.6 If this is the case, there 
is no reason why this would not count as pho-
tographic means in my account. This could be 
described as a process that controls the interaction 
– or the effect – of light with the photosensitive 
material during the process of transduction. After 
all, what the photographer is doing is prevent-
ing whatever effect the action of light would have 
had on the silver halides had the chemicals been 
able to interact with them. The fact that the mask 
is applied by painting over the emulsion does not 
change the fact what the photographer is doing is 
controlling the action of light – after all, it is pre-
venting it from having a visible effect. There are, 
of course, cases of drawing over images that would 
indeed be ruled out as strictly photographic in 
this account, but these are cases where the process 
of painting do not play any role in the manipula-
tion or the interaction of light with the photosen-
sitive material.
Let us consider the second case.
Case II:
Another entirely standard means of achieving the 
same result [namely, inhibiting the exposure of some 
part of an image while printing] that would be ruled 
out on this account is selectively developing the sur-
face of the print by holding some area of it in (or 
out) of the developer during development. This will 
be ruled out because it does not «consist solely in the 
6 Masking agents are products that are applied on the 
photographic paper or print while it is under the action 
of chemicals to avoid that those chemicals interact with a 
specific part of the surface. Then they are washed out and 
removed.
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exploitation, manipulation, or control of the incidence 
of light onto, and its interaction with, a photosensitive 
material», despite involving the control of something 
equally fundamental to photography, the processes 
through which the chemical reaction of silver halides 
to light becomes visible (Costello [2018]: 86).
It seems to me, that here we can give a simi-
lar argument to the one offered in response to 
the first case. This example is meant to show that 
«selectively developing the surface of the print by 
holding some area of it in (or out) of the devel-
oper during development» is not considered pho-
tographic on my account. But I think it is indeed, 
and more or less for the same reason: by not 
allowing part of the surface of the print to be in 
contact with the developer (chemical), what the 
photographer is doing is blocking the effect the 
light would have had on the silver halides (now 
turned into metallic silver) had the chemicals 
been able to interact with them.
What about the third case?
Case III:
[I]f a photographer allows light to pass through her 
hands so as to expose a particular area of a print 
for longer («burning in») this counts as strictly pho-
tographic means. But if a more expedient or accurate 
way to achieve the same result were to rub that area 
of the print vigorously with cotton bud during devel-
opment, so as to speed up the developer’s action (by 
raising the local temperature of the print’s surface), 
that would not» (Costello [2018]: 86).
Again, this case objects that rubbing certain 
areas of the print with a cotton bud during devel-
opment, so as to speed up the developer’s action 
(by raising the local temperature of the print’s sur-
face), would not count as strictly photographic 
on the account. But again, I do not see why this 
is the case. The developer is a «reducing» agent 
with the ability to identify crystals that have been 
exposed to light. Raising the temperature during 
the developing process is a way to speed up the 
process of «reducing» those exposed crystals (nor-
mally) in order to increase the contrast or density 
of the exposed areas of the image. Another way to 
describe this could be to say that such process is a 
way of controlling the way in which the effect of 
the exposure of light on the photosensitive surface 
would ultimately end up looking. Clearly, what 
the photographer is doing here is not controlling 
directly how the beam of light exposes the photo-
sensitive surface, but the action of light onto the 
photosensitive surface does not end up with the 
exposure; it has further effects that can be con-
trolled in different ways. What the photographer 
is doing here, I think, is controlling the ulterior 
effects of this light exposure and this, I think, per-
fectly counts as an «interaction of light with the 
photosensitive surface». How the light interacts 
with the photosensitive material depends, partly, 
on how the chemicals that allow the latent image 
to become visible are used and manipulated.
It seems to me, then, that Costello’s examples 
are not entirely convincing to show that the idea 
of strictly photographic means I proposed excludes 
many processed used frequently by photographers. 
It is true, however, that there are certain processes 
or techniques that are indeed excluded if we fol-
low such definition, and some of these processes 
are frequent in the practice of photography. This is 
something that I clearly acknowledge in her paper 
(Atencia-Linares [2012]: 21). But this does not, in 
anyway, entail that using these techniques would 
disqualify an image from being a photograph or 
even a pure photograph. Nothing in this account 
entails that, if an image is not made by purely 
photographic means, it is thereby not a photo-
graph or less of a photograph. Neither it commits 
its advocates to saying, as Costello suggests in his 
second objection, that photographers who decide 
to use non-photographic means are becoming 
painters.
The purpose of defining what counts as strict-
ly photographic means in the way I proposed was 
only intended to show, against the orthodox view, 
that a photographer could produce if she so choos-
es a representation of a fictional entity by purely 
photographic means, not that she should do so if 
she wants her image to count as a photograph. In 
other words, this view is descriptive and not pre-
scriptive. Describing what counts as (representing 
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by) photographic means is a separate and differ-
ent issue from proposing what counts as a pho-
tograph. There is no implication from one thing 
to the other. After all, there might be images that 
combine representations done by photographic 
and non-photographic means that still count as a 
photograph. Also, there can be other images that 
do so as well, but that does not make sense to 
categorize as photographs. From the WNT, or at 
least from my view, does not follow any definition 
of what counts as a photograph. In fact, as I will 
argue in the next section, I think that a serious 
problem of the RNT is that it tries to extrapolate 
a notion of what a photograph is from the idea of 
how the photographic process works.
3. Lopes’ Radical New Theory and its conception of photog-
raphy
More radical views such as Dominic Lopes’s 
also reject the reductionism of the orthodox the-
ory and endorse the idea that in order to under-
stand photography we should take seriously the 
photographic process as described by Wilson. 
Now, after revising the various stages of the pho-
tographic process Lopes provides what he claims 
to be the definition of the photograph according to 
(his version of) the new theory:
What is a photograph? The new theory answers: a 
photograph is an image that is the product of a pho-
tographic process, which includes a photographic 
event plus processes for making marked surfaces. Stat-
ed in full:
A photograph is an image output by a mark-making 
process taking input from an electro-chemical event 
that records information from a light image of a pro-
photographic scene (Lopes [2016]: 81).
Or as Costello paraphrases the idea:
[A]n item is a photograph if and only if it is an image 
that is a product of a photographic process, where a 
photographic process includes (1) a photographic 
event as well as (2) processes for the production of 
images (Costello [2018]: 88).
The motivation behind this new definition is 
to account for the fact that, even when photog-
raphy originates in the register of a light image, 
there are various ulterior processes that may take 
place in the production of a photograph that are 
or might be shared with the production of other 
types of images. But the fact that these ulterior 
processes are involved does not prevent that an 
image is still considered a photograph.
An advantage that this definition is supposed 
to provide is that it is sufficiently open so as to 
count as photographs controversial cases such as 
Gerhard Richter’s photo-paintings. Richter’s pho-
to-paintings are what would otherwise be called 
photorealistic paintings – a type of image made 
with paint that try to mimic the hyperrealist phe-
nomenology of photographs. Richter however, 
explicitly claims that he prefers to consider them 
photographs himself considers photographs (Rich-
ter [1995]: 73). This case might be controversial, 
but if one takes Richter’s words at face value it will 
certainly speak up for Lopes’ view. Now the prob-
lem with this definition is that it would count as 
photographs cases that neither their authors nor 
the critical practices would be willing to categorize 
as such. Moreover, in many cases it would make 
little sense to consider them photographs. Cos-
tello provides one telling example illustrating this 
point: the case of an imaginary photo-painting of 
the Kölner Dom:
Richter projects a photograph of Kölner Dom onto the 
surface of a canvas, traces its outlines, then sets about 
painting in the image. Almost finished, he begins 
«blurring» the likeness thereby created, by dragging 
solvent across its wet surface. Applying more and 
more solvent, but still not happy, he eventually resorts 
either to scraping away the image entirely or dragging 
fresh paint across the canvas with an outsized silk-
screen blade. The resulting image is a largely mono-
chromatic gray abstract with residual traces of other 
colours and some facture (Costello [2018]: 94).
The idea is that this hypothetical image is 
originated in a photographic event, but, would 
we be willing to call this a photograph? And more 
importantly, would it make sense to call it so? The 
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emphasis on the hypothetical fact that the picture 
originated in a photographic event and the datum 
that it is a fictional Richter picture, could lean us 
toward a more accepting stance towards Lopes’ 
view – we could perhaps claim that the photo-
graphic origins play a central role in appreciation 
of the picture and, if Richter himself were willing 
to call such picture a photograph maybe there is a 
good reason for doing so. However, there are oth-
er non-imaginary, actual cases that I think render 
this definition much more implausible. Here are 
some.
Most photo-realist paintings take photographs 
as their source. In these cases, conditions 1 and 2 
of Lopes’ definition are met. However, in the vast 
majority of the cases (i) their authors are will-
ing to call their pictures paintings, (ii) the critical 
practices consider them as belonging to a sub-
category or a style of painting and (iv) it makes 
much sense – in these cases – to appreciate them 
as paintings than as photographs.
In fact, nowadays, many realist and not-so-
realist paintings and drawings (such as portraits, 
landscapes, etc.) also take photographs as their 
source; unlike photo-realist paintings, these pic-
tures do not aim to mimic the phenomenology of 
photography, but they use photographs as a source 
because it is more convenient to use a photograph 
than to spend endless hours in front of a sitter or 
outdoors subject to the inclemencies of the weath-
er. When these are the cases in point, would the 
fact that the process of production of these images 
involves a photographic event in their origin qual-
ify them as photographs? That seems to me to be a 
very revisionist move to make.
The following example makes more evident 
how puzzling the definition could turn out to 
be. If we strictly follow the definition, if I take a 
photocopy of, say, a book or a handout and make 
some doodles on the margins, that would also 
meet both conditions. The photocopy involves, 
as a matter of fact, a photographic event and the 
doodles on the margin count as a type of process 
of image-production. But would a regular hand-
out used in class count in any relevant sense as a 
photograph? Maybe in some especial case it could 
turn out to be so – say, if a given provocateur con-
ceptual author, in a spirit similar to Richter insists 
that her artistic handout is a photograph. But it 
seems to me that the definition predicts that any 
handout should be considered a photograph. This, 
however, strikes me as very implausible, if only 
because it would not make much sense to appreci-
ate it in the same category as other photographs.
Considering all these cases, it seems to me that 
the criticism that Costello directed to my view is 
better directed to Lopes’ more radical version of 
the new theory that he seems to favour: «It is not 
for philosophy, but first order practice and its crit-
icism, to determine what counts as a photograph» 
(Costello [2018]: 86-87).
I think the move from emphasizing the ques-
tion «what is a photograph?» to «what is photog-
raphy?» that inspired the new theory in the first 
place, was a right move to make, but going back 
to the question of what is a photograph? and 
responding it with straitjacketed necessary and 
sufficient conditions is more a regress than a pro-
gress.
Maybe, as philosophers, the only liberal 
account that we could give regarding what it is 
for an image to be a photograph would be one 
that puts the weight of classification on practices 
of appreciation. Developing such a view is beyond 
the scope of this presentation but one sketchy sug-
gestion could be to follow the lines of Kendall 
Walton’s categories of art (1970). Being a photo-
graph, the account could claim, in Waltonian spir-
it, is tantamount to belonging to a category of art, 
namely, «the category of photographs» – where 
categories of art are ways of classifying works in 
ways that affect our appreciation of them. Mem-
bership in the category of «photography», as in 
most categories, would not be determined by nec-
essary and sufficient conditions, but rather by a 
cluster of non-essential criteria that include not 
only (standard, contra-standard and variable) fea-
tures internal to the work, but also things such as 
the category in which the artist intended the work 
to be appreciated, or in which the artist’s contem-
poraries would have placed it, and the category in 
which the work is better appreciated.
224 Catharine Abell, Paloma Atencia-Linares, Dominic McIver, Lopes Diarmuid Costello
Given that the practice of photography is an 
established one, it would not be too difficult to 
determine which properties tend to be present 
in images we typically classify as photographs, 
or that typically lead us to classify them as such 
(standard properties) and which are those that 
rarely appear in images we call photographs or 
tend to disqualify them from such category (con-
tra-standard properties). Among the standard 
properties one could count things such as being 
a two-dimensional pictorial representation with a 
peculiar realistic phenomenology (similar to that 
of a mirror, or in which we perceive subjects and 
scenes as concrete particulars)7 being made pre-
ponderantly by «photographic means» (in the rel-
evant sense), lack a three-dimensional textured 
surface, etc. Among its contra-standard features, 
one could count the following: presenting a sig-
nificant number of non-photographic techniques 
such as the use of paint, ink or marks that are 
not created by the action of light; lack a realistic 
phenomenology, present texture in the surface, 
etc. These features, however, would not provide 
the last word regarding classification as authorial 
intentions, practices of classification and optimal 
categorization would also play a significant role. 
At any rate, the point I was trying to make is 
that, although Lopes’ RNT tries to provide a more 
liberal view of what counts as a photograph, it 
ends up being equally prescriptive and mislead-
ing than the orthodox theory. While the orthodox 
theory excluded many actual photographs from 
the category for considering them closer to paint-
ings, the RNT conceives of as photographs things 
that clearly fall, and are better appreciated, in oth-
er categories. 
4. Photographic means
There is another aspect in which Lopes’ RTN 
tries to depart from the Orthodox view and, I 
think, ends up being paradoxically very close to 
it. One of the main objections that the NT raised 
again the orthodoxy was that the latter was reduc-
7 See Atencia-Linares (2013), chapter 3.
tionist regarding what counts as photographic. 
However, even when the NT makes it clear that 
the photographic process is far more complex 
than the orthodoxy has it, the RNT ends up also 
being reductionist by putting most of the weight 
onto one stage of the process: the photographic 
event; a stage, moreover, which I argue is ill-con-
ceived.
According to the RNT, the photographic pro-
cess is multi-staged, but the photographic event – 
the recording of the light image – is the only one 
that can be considered strictly photographic.
All four stages of the photographic process are essen-
tial to making a photograph, but only one is funda-
mentally unique to photography [...] Only the pho-
tographic event is intrinsically photographic (Lopes 
[2016]: 81).
Notice that the account of (strictly) photo-
graphic means that derives from this view is far 
more restrictive than the one provided by the 
WNT:
(RNT) Photographic means: any action or 
technique performed or taking place during the 
recording of the information of the light image on a 
storage medium.
(WNT) Photographic means: any action or 
technique performed or taking place during the 
production of an image, including the stages of 
exposure, transduction and storing, that consists 
solely in the exploitation, manipulation, or control 
of the incidence of light onto, and its interaction 
with, a photosensitive material.8
In the light of this comparison it seems that 
the RNT is more restrictive than the WNT. So, 
again, it seems to me that the objection Costello 
raised against the WNT is better placed against 
the RNT: Why should we rule out other processes 
that are typically done in the darkroom (at stages 
different from the photographic event) as strictly 
photographic?
8 Notice that both accounts admit that other processes 
that are ruled out are also part of the practice of photog-
raphy. So, there is no difference along these lines.
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Lopes’ answer is that other processes that take 
place at other stages are not unique to photogra-
phy. But this answer, I think, rests on an equivoca-
tion: Lopes’ seems to be equating «what is unique 
to photography» to «what is intrinsically photo-
graphic». But these are not equivalent: something 
can be intrinsically photographic – for example, 
in virtue of the exploitation, manipulation or con-
trol of light – and not be unique to photography. 
After all, works in other media can introduce 
photographic elements or employ photographic 
techniques. In fact, if one does not count every-
thing that originates in a photographic event as a 
photograph, as Lopes’ does, one would not be led 
to think that the photographic event is unique to 
photography.
Now, why do I think we should include other 
processes that take place at other stages of pho-
tography as intrinsically photographic? Well, for 
similar reasons I adduced in response to Cos-
tello’s objections: because some of these processes 
are part and parcel of what makes it possible for 
the light to have the effect it has onto the photo-
sensitive material in the way it does. It is possible 
that the chemical used as developer has other uses 
unrelated to turning latent (light) images into pat-
ent ones – and thereby one cannot say that the 
action of that chemical is unique to photography. 
However, when the process is indeed used in pho-
tography and it plays a constitutive role in the par-
ticular effect the light has onto a photosensitive 
material, the process is indeed intrinsic to the pro-
duction of the image and thereby would count as 
photographic. Put more generally, there are mark-
making processes that are used in other media 
different from photography and thereby are not 
unique to it, but when they are used in the pho-
tographic process and they play a constitutive role 
in how the action of light affects the photosensi-
tive surface, they can indeed count as intrinsically 
photographic.
5. Conclusion
If what I have said so far is sound, Costel-
lo’s objections to the (purported) restrictive or 
weak version of the new theory cannot only be 
answered by this account, but also, they seem to 
be better suited as objections to Lopes’s radical 
version of the new theory that Costello prefers. 
To summarize, Costello’s objections against the 
WNT where two: (i) that the notion of photo-
graphic means the WNT provides is too restric-
tive because it rules out as photographic many 
techniques photographers typically perform in 
the darkroom (in particular his cases concerned 
the manipulation of chemicals which are essential 
to the photographic processes); (ii) that the WNT 
prescribes an idea of what counts as a photograph 
that lacks normative force. After all, «it is not for 
philosophy, but first order practice and its criti-
cism, to determine what counts as a photograph».
Against these objections, my answer was that 
they do not affect the version of the WNT that 
Costello criticizes. On the one hand, I fully agree 
with the view that certain actions involving the 
manipulation of chemicals should count as photo-
graphic. Also, I think they do so in my account: 
manipulating the chemicals sometimes amounts 
to controlling the interaction the effect of light 
has with the photosensitive surface. The action of 
light does not end with the exposure; it has fur-
ther effects that can be controlled in subsequent 
stages of the process. On the other hand, the 
account does not prescribe an idea of what counts 
as a photograph. A notion of what counts of pho-
tographic means does not entail a notion of what 
counts as a photograph. The notion of photograph-
ic means does not entail a notion of what counts 
as a photograph. Furthermore, I argued that the 
objections are better suited for the RNT. After all, 
it provides an indeed restrictive notion of pho-
tographic means – one that explicitly does not 
count most actions performed in the darkroom 
as intrinsically photographic. Moreover, it does 
indeed prescribe an idea of photography that also 
lacks normative force: why should we give up cur-
rent classification of, say, all photo-realist paint-
ings as paintings and classify them as photographs 
instead? If this is the case, why should we prefer 
the radical view? There might be ulterior reasons 
to do so, but these don’t seem to be the ones.
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Abstract. In Four Arts of Photography, Lopes argues that pho-
tography is any mark-making processes that takes input from 
an electro-chemical event that records information from a light 
image of a pro-photographic scene. This paper addresses con-
cerns that the account is too permissive by stressing that there 
is more to photographic art than being a photograph: the pho-
tographic arts are social practices constituted by norms that 
govern how the technology is used. The intuitions that seem to 
raise concerns about Lopes’s account are not intuitions about 
photography; they are intuitions about photographic art. The 
paper also concedes that epistemically-oriented photographic 
practices should be understood more broadly than they are in 
Four Arts of Photography.
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Catharine Abell and Paloma Atencia-Linares 
follow Diarmuid Costello (2018) in contrasting 
«permissive» and «restrictive» theories of photog-
raphy, but theories permit nothing and restrict 
nothing, for they aim to explain and illuminate, 
to shed light on a phenomenon, which they often 
leave undisturbed. The ‘new’ theory of photogra-
phy defended in Four Arts of Photography is not 
some kind of metaphysical bouncer.
Three gestures shape the book’s approach. 
First, shifting away from the focus, in most ana-
lytic aesthetics, on photography’s epistemic pow-
ers, the book gives priority to photography’s artis-
tic and aesthetic power. Second, the book follows 
a «social turn» in thinking about the arts: there 
are four (or more) arts of photography because 
the one medium is accommodated within several 
artistic practices, which are social practices. Third, 
the method of the book is not to model intuitions 
about what counts as a photograph, or as photog-
raphy; its method is second-order. Abell and Aten-
cia-Linares write eloquently about the first gesture, 
but a few more words about the second and third 
will set the stage to allay their concerns about the 
book’s «permissiveness».
The idea that there are several arts of photog-
raphy applies a general framework for crafting 
theories of the arts (Lopes [2014]: chapters 7 and 
8; Lopes [2018b]: chapter 6). According to this 
framework, any art form involves a means of mak-
ing which is constituted as a medium by being 
subject to norms of evaluation. Since norms con-
stitute social practices, the arts are social practices. 
A theory of photography is therefore a theory of 
a technology, a means of making, while a theory 
of a photographic art explains how the technology 
figures in normatively-governed, socially embed-
ded acts of appreciation.
Much philosophy is first order in the sense 
that the philosopher theorises about some phe-
nomenon with which they are personally famil-
iar, their familiarity often being expressed as 
«intuitions». Some philosophy is second-order 
in the sense that the philosopher theorises about 
a phenomenon as it is represented in the hypoth-
eses and explanations of empirical scholars. Hence 
some metaphysicians craft theories of time to 
model their intuitions about time, but philoso-
phers of science usually craft theories of time as 
it figures in the hypotheses and explanations of 
physics. More aesthetics should be like philoso-
phy of science: it should treat artistic and aesthetic 
phenomena as ones that figure in the hypotheses 
and explanations of the behavioural and social sci-
ences (Lopes [2018a]).
In Four Arts, second-order method powers 
the social turn. The book advocates a theory of 
photography that characterizes a means of mak-
ing that figures in normatively-governed acts of 
appreciation. To get at the norms, each of the four 
arts of photography is introduced through detailed 
case studies of specific photographs as they are 
understood in the writings art historians. Art his-
torical writing obviously does not determine what 
photography is (see Costello [2018]: 86-87). The 
assumption is merely that implicit in the writ-
ings of art historians are norms of evaluation that 
manifest a social practice. We can therefore theo-
rise about the arts of photography as they figure 
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in these writings. By corollary, there is not much 
point in fretting over our intuitions about imagi-
nary cases – cases that have no social reality.
Concerns about permissiveness generate coun-
terexamples to the new theory and its embrace of 
lyric photography, especially Gerhardt Richter’s 
Betty. Ironically, Betty is not a paradigm of lyric 
photography in the book. More central cases are 
Richard Mosse’s war photographs in infrared film, 
Catharine Yass’s darkroom trickery in her Royal 
Sovereign Light series, and Thomas Ruff ’s monu-
mental blow ups of 72 dpi porn jpegs (Lopes 
[2016]: 91-94). Philosophers on a quest to test 
intuitions will make a bee line for Betty, passing 
by the practice of lyric photography as we see it in 
the writings of critics and historians.
At any rate, it is Mosse, Yass, and Ruff who 
motivate the proposal that «(NT) a photograph is 
an image output by a mark-making process taking 
input from an electro-chemical event that records 
information from a light image of a pro-photo-
graphic scene» (Lopes [2016]: 81).
Think of (NT) as stipulating that a photograph 
is any product of such a four-stage process. All 
four stages are intrinsically photographic in the 
sense that they jointly constitute the process. At 
the same time, the pro-photographic scene, light 
image, and mark-making stages are not intrinsi-
cally photographic in the sense that they count as 
photographic only by standing in relation to the 
photographic event. The beauty of the move is that 
any mark-marking process counts as photographic 
as long it is stands in the right relation to a photo-
graphic event.
Atencia-Linares argues that (NT) counts pho-
tocopies as photographs, but we do not consider 
them as photographs, so (NT) is false. This says 
more about us than it says about photography. 
I invite you to visit your local copy shop, place 
your hand on the glass, hit the green button, 
and inspect the result. Need it be said that the 
machine is made up of parts that are analogues of 
your digital photography setup: a lens, a CCD, a 
computer to process image data, and a printer?
What about photorealist paintings made by 
meticulously copying snapshots? Atencia-Linares 
remarks that we appreciate them as paintings rath-
er than photographs. I say we appreciate them as 
paintings and as photographs – as painted marks 
capturing information from a photographic event. 
After all, we fail to appreciate them as photorealis-
tic until we take account of their snapshot origins. 
The norms of the practice of photorealism give the 
photographic process appreciative relevance. (NT) 
explains how photorealism is not ordinary paint-
ing: photorealistic paintings are essentially prod-
ucts of photographic processes.
Photorealist practice contrasts with the prac-
tice of a painter like Cézanne, who used photo-
graphs as painting aids. A Cézanne is a photo-
graph in the utterly innocuous sense that it is a 
product of a photographic process. Here the pro-
cess is a means of making, not a medium, because 
no norms of Cézanne’s practice give the photo-
graphic process appreciative relevance. (A painting 
is also a product of an evaporation process, and 
that is not appreciatively relevant either).
Return to Richter. He paints the Kölner Dom 
then blurs away all traces of the original scene. 
Is it a photograph, according to (NT)? Rephrase: 
does it suffice to make a photograph that there 
be a photographic event in the causal history of 
an image? Inputs and outputs are not just causes; 
they are stages of information processing. Few 
systems for processing information are lossless, 
and loss is a matter of degree. Technically, if there 
some modicum of information transfer, we have a 
photograph. When it comes to art and aesthetics, 
amount of information is irrelevant. What matters 
is whether the image is one to be appreciated as 
a product of a photographic process within which 
information is processed.
Here we can learn from Abell’s clever twist on 
Costello’s conundrum. Imagine that, disheartened 
by the «largely monochromatic grey abstract», 
Richter «retraced from memory the outlines of 
the Kölner Dom that had been projected onto 
the canvas, and coloured them in, ending up 
with something very similar to the image he had 
before he started the blurring process». According 
to (NT), the image is a photograph: it is a prod-
uct of a photographic process, one that includes 
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information processing. Should you experience an 
affront to your intuitions, I prescribe an error the-
ory: your intuitions concern photographic art and 
you mistakenly identify the art form with a means 
of making. To see this, imagine a practice. Eras-
ing paintings based on photographs and retracing 
them from memory is now a thing. All the young 
hotshots are doing it, while evoking 1930 surreal-
ist games and those heavy 1960s screeds about the 
death of the artist. The Unerasure show arrives at 
MoMA. Would you be subject to any appreciative 
norms predicated on how the works in the show 
were made using photographic processes? Now, do 
not introspect an answer! Norms are social facts. 
We would have to look into the practice as it is 
understood in the hypotheses and explanations of 
the best empirical scholarship.
All contributors to this symposium agree that 
there exist some items that are products of the 
four stage process described in (NT). I call them 
«photographs», but it does not matter what we 
call them; what matters is that they exist and that 
they are relevant to appreciation. I add only that a 
good reading of history and criticism supports the 
proposition that there is a set of artistic practices 
that share in common their having norms that 
make it relevant to appreciation that images are 
products of the four stage process. The process is 
an artistic medium.
Before closing, Abell is exactly right to insist 
that not all epistemic practices function to sup-
ply knowledge. Four Arts proposes that epistemic 
practices of photography have norms that «restrict 
the photographic process in order to ensure belief‐
independent feature‐tracking» (2016: 111). The 
proposal misses the diversity of epistemic tasks we 
have to perform. A better – more permissive! – 
idea is that some photographic practices comprise 
norms that govern how photographic equipment 
is designed, manufactured, and then used to serve 
any of our epistemic needs (see 2016: 109). Abell 
spells out the details in a very promising way.
Theories are not metaphysical bouncers, and 
they are not dialectical bouncers either. A new 
theory should not seek to have the last word: a 
fresh approach to a phenomenon should invite 
just the kind of further reflection and refinement 
that we get from Abell, Atencia-Linares, and Cos-
tello.
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Abstract. In On Photography Costello traces the roots of cur-
rent conceptions of photography back to the formulations of its 
earliest pioneers, and shows that contemporary philosophical 
reflection on photography is an increasingly refined formaliza-
tion of intuitions that have been around since its invention, and 
by now permeate folk wisdom. Those intuitions are false in key 
respects. Costello’s reply considers the present state of debate, 
concluding that work remains to be done before New Theory 
can claim to have bested Orthodoxy. In particular, while New 
Theory does better in accounting for photography’s aesthetic 
capacities; the challenge remains to do as well with its alleged 
epistemic privilege. For this reason, New Theorists should cease 
worrying about Skeptical Orthodoxy, and direct their energies 
to Non-Skeptical Orthodoxy, which represents a much stiffer 
challenge. It also notes that despite New Theory’s attention to 
the photographic process, this remains incomplete in at least 
one important respect as currently described.
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One of my goals in On Photography was to 
show just how pervasive a certain way of thinking 
about photography is; that it not only dominates 
thinking about photography today but has done 
so since its origins. A simple explanation for this 
would be that is true, but this is not the explana-
tion I offer. I call the view «Orthodox Theory»: 
like other orthodoxies, it involves adherence to 
certain idées fixes. Given that I take it to be false, 
I need to offer some explanation where existing 
theory has gone wrong. I try to do so in the lat-
ter half of the book, drawing on a still developing 
«New Theory» of photography.
But first I trace the lineage of Orthodox The-
ory from photography’s pioneers through to the 
present day (Costello [2017]). It is grounded in a 
set of foundational intuitions about the nature of 
photography. These originate in Henry Fox-Talbot 
and Louis Daguerre’s characterisations of pho-
tography as «nature depicting itself through the 
agency of light». Differences of vocabulary aside, 
philosophical orthodoxy about photography is a 
formalization of these same intuitions which now 
also pervade folk theory. When contemporary 
philosophers maintain that photography is at bot-
tom an automated process in which a mechani-
cal apparatus produces images that depend caus-
ally and counterfactually on the scenes depicted 
in such a way as to bypass the beliefs and other 
mental states of the photographer, they build in a 
functionally equivalent non-agential explanation 
for the generation of photographs. For Daguerre 
and Talbot it is nature, for Scruton and Currie it 
is causal mechanism; but for neither is it human 
beings. Contrast this to how the paintings are typ-
ically thought to come into being.
From Daguerre and Fox-Talbot right through 
to Scruton and Currie one finds the same thought 
recurring: photography can be pure, or photogra-
phy can be art, but it cannot be both. If this trade 
off is accepted, it follows that when photography 
is art this must be for reasons other than it being 
photography. Otherwise pure photography could 
also be art; but this is precisely what accepting the 
trade off concedes cannot be the case.
The same pattern of thought underlies the oft-
noted tension between photography’s epistemic 
and aesthetic capacities. Pure photography is epis-
temically privileged: because it brackets the men-
tal states of the photographer, it is not subject to 
various forms of human fallibility; conversely, for 
photography to be of aesthetic interest, it needs 
to leverage just those mental states in such a way 
that they can underwrite our appreciative interest 
in the resulting image. Upshot: photography can 
be aesthetically interesting or epistemically privi-
leged, but it cannot be both.
But this is only half the story: for one of the 
most salient fault lines within Orthodoxy con-
cerns the implications of distinct versions for pho-
tography’s standing as art. This is something that 
New Theorists might be more attentive to than 
they have. Call these «Skeptical» and «Non-Skep-
tical» Orthodoxy, respectively. For Scruton, pho-
tographs are invisible; they are windows through 
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which one sees the world. For this reason, whatev-
er interest one takes in the photograph is an inter-
est that one could have taken in the scene seen 
directly. For Walton, photographs are transparent 
but not invisible: one sees the world by seeing the 
photograph, and this allows one to take an interest 
in the scene – as it appears through its photograph 
– that one could not have taken in the same scene 
seen directly (see Lopes [2003]: 433-438).
Where New Theorists depart from Ortho-
doxy, Skeptical and Non-Skeptical alike, is in 
their understanding of how photographs come 
into being. This is what makes New Theory new. 
Recording information by exposing a light sensi-
tive surface is necessary, but it is not sufficient for 
the production of photographs because, absent 
further stages of image-processing and rendering, 
no visible image can be produced. Since no one 
denies that photographs may be visually appreci-
ated, any stage required to generate such an image 
must be internal to photography proper. These 
stages may, but need not, be automated. Once this 
is clarified, it is apparent that photographers can 
invest their agency anywhere along the chain of 
processes necessary to produce an image and that 
intervention still count as strictly photographic.
While clearly sympathetic to New Theory, On 
Photography suggests several requirements that 
New Theory must meet for it to be considered a 
genuine advance on Orthodoxy, and raises various 
challenges for existing versions of New Theory.
The first requirement is that New Theory not 
secure photography’s aesthetic capacity on any 
basis that would render its epistemic capacities 
mysterious. These are central to our understand-
ing of photography and its uses; as Orthodoxy’s 
strong suit, any solution that renders these opaque 
would be a step backwards. This is also the rea-
son that Walton presents a much stiffer challenge 
to New Theory than Scruton, and one that the 
majority of New Theorists have seemed curiously 
reluctant to address as yet. This is because Wal-
ton’s general theory of depiction gives him a way 
to account for photography’s aesthetic capacities 
consistent with an Orthodox set of assumptions 
about the nature of photography (Costello [2018]: 
chapter 3). That is, his theory already has (or at 
least claims to have) a way of accounting for both, 
rather than one at the expense of the other. Even a 
philosopher as attuned to the epistemic aspects of 
photography as Catharine Abell seems to miss this 
here (Abell [2010]). This marginalization of Wal-
ton remains a blind spot in recent debate.
The second requirement is that New Theory 
is yet to be new or resolute enough in its under-
standing of photographic agency. For while it has 
had much to say about what takes place down-
stream of the photographic event – and this repre-
sents a genuine advance on Orthodoxy in enrich-
ing our understanding of the photographic pro-
cess – it cannot be assumed without argument 
that only what happens downstream of that event 
is relevant to understanding photography. For 
example: is it as obvious as New Theorists have 
so far maintained that photographs originate in 
photographic events? What about conception, pre-
visualisation and the like? Can the photographic 
process be exhaustively explained without them? 
(Costello [2017]: 448-450) Granted: none may 
turn out, once unpacked, to be unique to pho-
tography, but when they become part of a photo-
graphic process, are they not co-constitutive of the 
resulting image nonetheless?
So far as existing versions of New Theory 
are concerned, I distinguish a «Restrictive» and 
a «Permissive» strand, associated with the work 
of Paloma Atencia-Linares and Dominic McIver 
Lopes. I argue that the former rules out aspects 
of the photographic process that it should rule in, 
and that the latter rules in images that it should 
rule out. So much for my claims in the book: 
Lopes, Atencia-Linares and Abell reply to some of 
them here.
Lopes has provided two definitions of a photo-
graph in his recent writings:
(Def 1): An item is a photograph if and only if it is 
an image that is a product of a photographic process, 
where a photographic process includes (i) a photo-
graphic event as well as (ii) processes for the produc-
tion of images (Lopes [2012]: 115).
(Def 2): a photograph is an image output by a mark-
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making process taking input from an electro-chemical 
event that records information from a light image of a 
pro-photographic scene (Lopes [2016]: 81).
I take it that the latter, more recent defini-
tion is to be preferred because it makes the fact 
that photographic events comprise recording of 
information from a light image explicit. Abell rec-
ognizes the centrality of this and its implications 
for how permissive (or otherwise) Lopes’s account 
really is. But note that, on both definitions, there 
are constraints on neither: i) the media through 
which such an image need be rendered for it to 
count as a photograph, nor ii) how much infor-
mation from the light image need be preserved, 
so long as; (a) it implicates a photographic event 
in its causal history and (b) there is, as Lopes puts 
it here, «some modicum of information transfer» 
from that event.9 Prima facie, this is a very per-
missive theory indeed.
Given such a permissive conception, the chal-
lenge for New Theory will be to explain photogra-
phy’s epistemic advantage rather than its aesthetic 
interest. Lopes’s proposal is to «go social»: explain 
different uses of photography in terms of the 
social practices these uses subtend, and the con-
straints these place on how it is conducted within 
them. One might even call it sociological: certain 
institutional contexts (such as forensic, legal and 
press) work to ensure the preservation of belief 
independent feature tracking, though this is nei-
ther unique nor intrinsic to photography. Other 
media often track features independently of belief, 
and many photographs do not. Though, as Abell 
agrees, flouting belief-independent feature track-
ing may sometimes aid our epistemic enquiries, by 
making it easier to isolate and extract the sought 
after information. This is often true in medical 
imaging and astrophotography.
On Abell’s account, for an image’s photo-
graphic origins to bear on its appreciation need 
not entail that it track features independently 
of belief, but that it carry information from the 
9 See above Lopes’s essay Go Social: Replies to Catharine 
Abell and Paloma Atencia-Linares.
recording event by means of an effective communi-
cation channel. Abell takes this to be true of Rich-
ter’s Betty, which involves more or less mechani-
cally tracing a projected outline, various skills 
of hand and eye co-ordination, and a process of 
colour matching, but not her modified Kölner 
Dom. Because we take images generated in certain 
ways but not others to belong to effective com-
munication channels, only some kinds of image 
are salient for us as information-carriers. Given 
this, Abell proposes the following amendment to 
Lopes’s account:
(Def 2*): a photograph is an image output by 
a mark-making process that carries information 
from an electro-chemical event that records infor-
mation from a light image of a pro-photographic 
scene and does so through a communication chan-
nel that is effective at carrying such information.
Abell describes her proposal as «fairly permis-
sive». It is designed to show that appeal to belief 
independent feature tracking – even understood 
as institutionally enforced rather than intrinsic 
– is unnecessary. Photographs are epistemically 
privileged in virtue of i) carrying information in 
ii) an easily extractable depictive form iii) via a 
communication channel we recognise as effec-
tive. Belief independent feature tracking, natural 
counterfactual dependence and the like fall away, 
unless they can be shown to be necessary to an 
effective communication channel. Though «fairly 
permissive», this does not look like a proposal that 
Lopes can take over without being more restric-
tive than he presently wants to be about what may 
count as a photograph.
Paloma Atencia-Linares takes issue with the 
arguments of On Photography more directly, in 
particular my criticisms of Restrictive New Theory 
(RNT). For all the heat these seem to have gener-
ated, my criticism was in fact quite simple: RNT, 
I maintain, unwittingly neglects the wet side of 
analogue photography, by focusing exclusively on 
the role of light. (Analogous arguments might be 
made for the software side of digital photography.) 
Atencia-Linares believes I have mistaken the com-
mitments of her position:
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Photographic means: any action or technique per-
formed or taking place during the production of an 
image, including the stages of transduction and stor-
ing, that consists solely in the exploitation, manipula-
tion, or control of the incidence of light onto, and its 
interaction with, a photosensitive material (Atencia-
Linares [2012]: 22).
As she presents it here, her account always 
covered the kinds of (putative) counter-examples I 
raise against it, because all can be seen as ways of 
exploiting, controlling or manipulating the effect 
that the incidence of light on a light sensitive sur-
face would have had absent the action in question. 
I confess that it is not entirely clear to me whether 
this is indeed what Atencia-Linares originally had 
in mind. That is, I remain unsure whether she has 
shifted ground somewhat in light of my criticisms, 
or simply made the implications of her original 
position clear. Be that as it may – as presented 
here – I am happy to concede that my criticisms 
may arise from missing the full range of what 
«transduction» was supposed to cover in Atencia-
Linares’s account.
That said, if this is what Atencia-Linares had 
in mind, it may open up a different kind of worry: 
that the account avoids the charge of restrictive-
ness by being too accommodating. The question 
is whether there is anything that cannot be re-
described in such a way as «exploiting, manipu-
lating or controlling» the effect that the incidence 
of light would have had, absent the intervention in 
question. The range of actions and processes that 
can be counterfactually considered in relation to 
their effect on the incidence of light seems poten-
tially limitless. What about turning off the lights 
or waiting for a shadow to fall across the subject 
before taking a photograph, or using some kind 
of mirror or reflector to dazzle the camera? How 
about failing to remove the lens cap? Should both 
– commission and omission – count? If so, what 
prevents the notion of photographic means at 
stake becoming uninformative – merely trivially 
true?
In the course of defending RNT, Atencia-Lin-
ares claims that Permissive New Theory (PNT) 
is in fact more restrictive, by virtue of restrict-
ing what is «intrinsically photographic» to the 
photographic event. The charge of restrictiveness 
thus rebounds to the detriment of PNT. This is 
an interesting and provocative claim. But it sug-
gests, as does Lopes’s response to it here, that we 
all agree on the substantive issue; that it is the 
whole process, including what photographers do 
in the darkroom or at the monitor, in the studio 
or on location, together with whatever tools or 
technologies they employ, that our philosophical 
theories of photography should be in the business 
of capturing. One may go astray not only by gen-
eralizing from a narrow set of examples, but from 
a partial account of the process. Thus, I cite Garry 
Winogrand’s posthumous processed images in the 
book as an example of the difficulties that may 
arise from individuating photographs solely on the 
basis of photographic events.
A couple of clarifications about what I do and 
do not maintain in closing: I do not endorse PNT 
over RNT. What I endorse is the animating spirit 
and motivation of New Theory as a whole, which 
I see as a welcome corrective to some of the more 
evident shortcomings of Orthodoxy, while raising 
worries about both its extant formulations to date. 
Atencia-Linares and I agree, for example, that 
what is most productive about New Theory is its 
reorientation from photographic product to pro-
cess inspired by the work of Patrick Maynard.
Re-characterising what I term «Restrictive» 
and «Permissive» (a descriptive distinction) as 
«Conservative» versus «Radical», projects an eval-
uative dimension onto what I wrote that is not 
there. I simply see the two as letting more or less 
through, and even Atencia-Linares does not dis-
pute this. As to which is to be preferred, I think 
the jury remains out. Hence, I raise criticism for 
both. My considered view is that New Theory still 
has considerable work to do before it can genuine-
ly claim to have bested Orthodoxy. For this rea-
son, I marvel at the amount of ink that continues 
to be spilt on Skeptical Orthodoxy. To my mind 
this is too easy a target. Non-Skeptical Orthodoxy 
remains the position against which New Theory 
needs to demonstrate its merits.
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Let me conclude on a note of agreement: 
despite our different commitments, Abell, Aten-
cia-Linares, Lopes and I agree that practices and/
or norms of appreciation remain ineliminable to 
theories of photography. This comes out especially 
clearly in Lopes’s reply to Abell’s witty (and mar-
vellously titled) twist on the Kölner Dom case. But 
it is equally apparent in Atencia-Linares’s appeal to 
Walton’s on «categories» of art, and the role that 
the salience (or otherwise) of diverse media as 
communication channels plays in Abell’s account. 
Though we develop the thought in different ways, 
all of us believe not only that background beliefs 
about photographic aetiology condition how we 
understand (and so appreciate) what we are look-
ing at when what we’re looking at is a photograph, 
but that this should be captured in our theories 
of photography. This is a timely reminder of the 
importance of background beliefs (re. categories, 
art forms, image kinds and the like) for the appre-
ciation of photography and appreciation more 
generally.
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